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PHASES III AND IV: A DANGEROUS OVERLAP

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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17 May 2005

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Abstract

The recent war in Iraq has demonstrated that contemporary and future wars are likely to increase the overlap between the decisive combat (phase III) and transition operations (phase IV) of a campaign. The presence of this overlap requires operational commanders to ensure their forces are trained to and equipped with both lethal and non-lethal means in order to be able to use the correct level of force necessary to accomplish the mission. While "Shock and Awe" operations may quickly achieve decisive military results, they may also place US forces in a position where the local populace, comprised largely of non-combatants, may be energized into becoming part of an unruly, even riotous, mob. US combat forces placed into situations like this will need the capability provided by non-lethal weapons (NLW). An operational commander's combat forces need this ability to operate across the use-of-force continuum, and they need this capability, which must be both light and relevant, *right now*. In addition, ensuring US forces minimize non-combatant casualties, and thus do not further alienate the local populace, will be an important objective of phase IV operations. In the end, NLW give the operational commander's combat forces the ability to make a positive difference; that of using the right amount of force for the specific situation.

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We need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you have to look at this thing from start to finish. It is not a phased conflict; there is not a fighting part and then another part. It is a nine-inning game.

-General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.)¹

INTRODUCTION

As the recent war in Iraq has demonstrated, contemporary and future wars are likely to increase the overlap between the decisive combat and transition operations phases of a campaign. United States (US) doctrine for joint operations labels decisive combat as phase III and transition operations as phase IV within the operations of a campaign.² The presence of this overlap requires operational commanders to ensure that their forces are trained to and equipped on both lethal and non-lethal means in order to be able to use the force necessary to accomplish the task at hand.

General Zinni speaks to the overlap between phase III and IV operations. It has grown to the extent that there may no longer exist a discernable difference between these two phases in future wars. Instead, we are likely to face one large gray area in which US forces will be required to engage in both decisive combat and transitional operations. The war in Iraq also has demonstrated that the quickened pace of future wars can be a double-edged sword. "Shock and awe" may quickly achieve decisive military results, but it may also place US forces in a position where the local populace, comprised largely of non-combatants, may be energized into becoming part of an unruly, even riotous, mob. US forces may enter an enemy city with considerable momentum and simultaneously confront two very distinct elements. Consider General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)'s urban fighting scenario: on one block a US platoon may engage in heated combat as it faces elements of the enemy's armed forces, while only a block away another platoon from the same company may need to

use less-than-deadly force as it encounters a large group of non-combatants protesting a lack of electricity and water.³

In facing these types of scenarios, an operational commander must ensure that his combat forces are trained to and equipped with both lethal and non-lethal means. The forces engaged in heated combat operations must decisively defeat the enemy using the lethal means at their disposal. To a typical service member this will equate to well-placed shots from his service rifle.

The other platoon, however, suffers a different predicament. Although not confronting enemy soldiers armed with assault rifles, this unit faces an increasingly angry civilian mob on the verge of rioting. The self-defense concepts of “hostile act, hostile intent” would allow this US platoon to utilize deadly force if the mob became sufficiently violent. However, does the operational commander want, and can the US afford, US forces to kill non-combatants when another, less-deadly result is possible? In many types of conflicts, the operational commander’s objectives will have to include an end-state that will support successful phase IV operations. To best accomplish this he will want to obtain the support of as much of the local populace as possible. The killing of non-combatants loses him that local support and makes this objective more difficult to accomplish. Without an immediately-available non-lethal weapon system, deadly force may be the only option US forces possess in the face of angry civilians who get close enough to inflict serious bodily harm with sticks and rocks. The operational commander must be additionally concerned with the international community’s expectation that the US military is capable of striking what it wants, when it wants; without fail. The US’ use of precision guided munitions (PGM) over last 15 years has helped to create the unrealistic expectation that the US military

will not cause collateral damage. If the US military does “miss” a target and cause collateral damage, it creates alarming international headlines. Similarly, in combat operations where US forces possess NLW, the killing of non-combatants causes similar international outrage. In effect, the US has become a prisoner to its own technological innovations; the international community expects that the US military will never cause any collateral damage.

These urban fighting scenarios do not speak to a legal question about the use of deadly force (in this scenario, both national and international concepts of self-defense would appear to permit the use of deadly force), but rather a policy matter: the operational commander needs to win the peace after combat has ended. If the platoon facing the civilians who are protesting due to a lack of essential utilities had previously been well-trained and well-equipped in both lethal and non-lethal means, the end of this scenario might well be far less violent. Rather than using deadly force to stop the mob, the US forces would quickly shift to their organic non-lethal weapons (NLW) and, with little or no loss of life, end the riot. US Combat forces need this ability to operate across the use-of-force continuum, and they need this capability, which must be both light and relevant, *right now*.

Technologies coming online at the present time allow for US combat forces to possess the NLW they need.⁴ In consequence, I focus here on the need for the operational commander to ensure that his combat forces possess the training and equipment to effectively use both lethal and non-lethal means. These forces will then be able to transition smoothly between both means, and thus be capable of utilizing the entire use-of-force continuum.

The operational commander must also strike the proper balance between force protection and the achievement of higher-level objectives such as winning the peace, the achievement of which may only be possible if he does not alienate the local populace. The

right and obligation of US commanders to defend themselves and their forces can legally give those forces the right to use deadly force to prevent a non-combatant from attacking, if that non-combatant presents a risk of committing serious bodily harm or death to that US service member. Thus, despite gaining the legal right to use deadly force in the above scenario, a US service member may be able to choose a NLW in order to de-escalate a potentially deadly situation -- without endangering himself.

The operational commander typically conveys his intent on the use-of-force by promulgating rules of engagement (ROE). When written clearly and succinctly, these ROE, for example, can communicate to subordinate commanders, and all combat forces, the operational commander's desire that they use NLW against non-combatants, while making clear that despite this desire, the forces retain the absolute right and obligation to defend themselves. Thus, if the combat forces possess NLW, and a situation involving non-combatants permits their use, the NLW would be used unless such use would interfere with the unit or individual's ability to utilize self-defense. Combat forces that are not trained on, and equipped with, NLW simply possess fewer options along the use-of-force continuum. Again, this is not a legal issue wherein US combat forces could be punished for not using NLW in a situation where self-defense had been triggered. Instead, these situations speak to instances where well-trained combat forces understand the higher objectives on minimizing collateral damage and attempt to use NLW, if possible, in an effort to de-escalate without bloodshed.

NLW: US POLICY AND RELATED BASIC LEGAL ISSUES

The Department of Defense (DoD) defines NLW as “weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.”⁵ This does not mean that NLW, whether due to improper employment or a failure in technology, will never cause fatalities. Rather, the definition points to the design and intended employment of the weapon system. NLW are designed to provide warfighters with non-lethal weapon systems that can be employed “across the full spectrum of threats and crises.”⁶ In recent years, technological innovation has brought this area to the threshold of light *and* compact NLWs -- critical attributes if combat forces are to be able to transition smoothly across the use-of-force continuum.⁷

“Light and compact” NLW systems would be borne by each soldier and Marine without significantly increasing their overall daily load. The best of all worlds will be a single, light weapon that can be selected for lethal or non-lethal use with the flip of a switch. Such weapon systems have been invented and are currently being tested. However, until such a system is in full production, light and compact will have to suffice.

To ensure compliance with all of the applicable international treaty obligations and the law of armed conflict (LOAC), DoD conducts a legal review on all NLW prior to their distribution to US forces.⁸ The key issues in the legal review are that the weapon does not cause suffering that is “needless, superfluous, or disproportionate to the military advantage reasonably expected from its use.” The weapon also must be able to be controlled in its aiming and be discriminate in its effects. Finally, its use cannot be prohibited by LOAC.⁹

ROE are “directives issued by competent authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement.”

One of the primary purposes of ROE is to provide guidance on the use-of-force by US forces.¹⁰ Historically, different ROE have been promulgated for peacekeeping/humanitarian operations and for combat operations. Traditionally, ROE for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations were defensive in nature; the forces had to wait for the opposition to evince ‘hostile act/hostile intent’ prior to engaging. In combat operations, however, the ROE have been more offensive, where US forces have needed only to positively identify the enemy prior to engaging. Future battlefields will require the operational commander to ensure that his forces receive clearly-written ROE that cover *both* decisive combat and transition phases as US forces will likely face situations involving both during the same conflict.¹¹

THE OBJECTIVE OF COMBAT OPERATIONS AND THE USE-OF-FORCE CONTINUUM

The objective of combat operations is not necessarily the killing of enemy soldiers, and since World War II at least, it has not been part of the US philosophy of war. Combat operations are a tool used in the attainment of a political end. Although it can be argued that killing is the goal when fighting insurgencies and other intra-state conflicts, even in these cases the keys to victory remain winning over the majority of the local populace through a successful “hearts and minds” campaign. In the long run, physical destruction and unwarranted fatalities are most often counterproductive to the achievement of the political ends.¹² The question then becomes: how does a nation win a conflict against a determined

enemy and at the same time do its best to refrain from killing non-combatants? One answer lies in a nation's training of its combat forces on NLW. NLW allows graduation in the use-of-force beyond the simple dichotomous choice between no force and deadly force. The use of force must be viewed on a continuum -- deadly force at one end and no use of force on the other. This "use-of-force continuum" rests upon the concept in which the level of force used in a situation matches that level required to accomplish the task. In the end, NLW should be used to fill the gap between deadly force at one end of the use-of-force continuum, and no-force at the other.¹³

DO NLW MAKE ROE UNACCEPTABLY COMPLEX?

One criticism to the approach advocated here is that it results in use-of-force guidance, usually contained in the ROE, too complex for the average service member to follow. However, that criticism neglects the importance training and leadership play in shaping the combat force. Proper and continuous training can instill in individual service members the ability to physically transition between these two means in a timely fashion. It will also teach the service member to appropriately judge when non-lethal and lethal means should be used. Proper leadership ensures the proper training is given, understood, and, at the operational and tactical level, carried out on the battlefield.

PHASE III AND PHASE IV OPERATIONS:

MINIMIZING COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Phasing operations within a joint campaign provides a tool by which an operational commander can organize his major operations so that they conduce to the same objective(s).

Phasing helps the operational commander to frame his intent and to effectively integrate and synchronize the different parts of the operation. Phasing establishes definitive stages during which “a large portion of the forces... are involved in similar or mutually supporting operations.”¹⁴ Phases are initiated as the operation evolves and terminated when the joint force commander decides.

In general, phases may be conducted sequentially or concurrently and may, and oftentimes do, overlap.¹⁵ The pace of recent conflicts, most especially the war in Iraq, have demonstrated that in future wars this overlap between phase III and phase IV operations will be the rule rather than the exception. Phase III (decisive combat) focuses on bringing the adversary to culmination while achieving the operational commander’s objectives. Conversely, Phase IV (transition operations) is typified by the achievement of the operational commander’s objectives and the re-establishment of the rule of a law in a stabilizing situation.¹⁶ While each phase may be distinguishable from the others as an identifiable episode, each is necessarily linked to the others and gains significance only in the larger context of a major operation.¹⁷ These necessary links bring out the overlap that exists between phases III and IV: US forces may be simultaneously faced with combat operations against the enemy and, as the enemy’s infrastructure begins to come apart, or as some non-combatants become upset with the US for making war upon their country, security and stability-type operations with the civilian populace. It is here, in the center of these scenarios that US combat forces must be able to smoothly transition across the use-of-force continuum.

Possession of both lethal and non-lethal means, along with the attendant expertise to utilize them, gives combat forces the greatest opportunity to accomplish the mission with the least amount of collateral damage. Less collateral damage gives US forces a better

opportunity to “win over” the local populace. Indiscriminate killing of non-combatants has the opposite effect. It inflames the local populace against the US and gives regional and global media the opportunity to portray US forces not as an upright and honorable force, but as “imperial stormtroopers” with little regard for the people of the nation.

NLW act as an enabler for the operational commander. Instead of lethal weapons escalating a confrontation between US forces and an already hostile group of non-combatants, the use of NLW can actually end the showdown with less bloodshed and violence. Instances of US forces using NLW to peacefully end a riot may not make the local television news, but the converse, where non-combatants are killed by US combat forces, most likely would appear on the news, and might well be very detrimental to the operational commander’s long-term objectives for the post-combat period. Though possibly legal under certain circumstances, the killing of non-combatants is rarely in the interests of the US. President Bush, in a May 2003 statement said that the achievement of his objectives in Iraq was possible “without directing violence against civilians.”¹⁸ The President’s quote underscores the importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties.

In the recent past, NLW have proven their utility when used by combat forces in furtherance of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. In Kosovo, in April 2000, a detachment of US soldiers from Task Force (TF) Falcon responded to a report of contraband weapons found in a local village. The detachment recovered the weapons and an alleged criminal, but they subsequently found their exit blocked by a crowd of angry non-combatants. Instead of employing their service rifles, they stopped and notified TF Falcon headquarters of their plight. Soon after, another detachment from TF Falcon, armed with NLW, arrived and defused the situation.¹⁹ While this scenario demonstrates the positive

aspects of NLW, it also showcases the problem with having only some US combat forces equipped with NLW: the fast pace of future wars will not allow combat forces the luxury of calling a “time-out” while waiting until the proverbial cavalry arrives with a magic goo-gun. Future battlefields promise less and less time in which decisions will have to be made. Thus, all combat forces need to be trained and equipped on NLW in order to be prepared to act with the level of force called for by each situation.

In 2004, a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force found that a “wider integration” of NLW in the US Army and US Marine Corps could have minimized property damage and loss of life at the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The Task Force had been directed to study the US military’s future need for NLW. The Task Force went on to state that “incorporating non-lethal weapon capabilities into the equipment, training, and doctrines of the armed services could substantially improve US effectiveness in conflict [and] post-conflict...”²⁰ The Task Force’s conclusions are relevant and on-point to this discussion. In Iraq, US combat forces were well prepared to fight enemy combatants but ill prepared and equipped to operate across the use-of-force continuum. More flexibility in the use of force translates into a better post-conflict peace. However, the cost to equip combat forces with both “light and relevant” NLW will not be cheap.²¹ As a result of its study, the Task Force recommended that the DoD Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate’s annual budget be increased from approximately \$30 million to \$300 million. This recommended increase is a worthwhile investment when compared with the enhanced capability it brings the operational commander.²²

NLW AND THEIR UTILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD

NLW give the US the ability to project its power across the spectrum of conflict with more options as to the level of force used.²³ While US combat forces had to remain prepared to fight enemy soldiers towards the end of major combat operations in Iraq, they also had to be prepared to deal with Iraqi civilians and civil disorder.²⁴ In future conflicts, the absence of NLW in the US service member's "quiver" will result in an inability to properly deal with the local populace.

US Marines in Ramadi in late 2004 were using deadly force on any person who, despite warnings, approached closer than 50 meters to their vehicles. Their use of deadly force pursuant to this policy resulted in many deaths. One Marine officer involved in the operations stated that this use of deadly force was "a shame" because in the end it meant that they had "killed a lot of innocent people."²⁵ Such a use of deadly force can also have the attendant effect of alienating the local populace and thus making more difficult the objective of "winning the peace." The ability to quickly transition from lethal to NLW, and back again, allows combat forces to accomplish the mission with as few non-combatant casualties as possible. NLW provide the operational commander more options. His combat forces are no longer limited in their choices on the use of force. This flexibility equates to a more appropriate use of force in each situation and, thus, less collateral damage.

FORCE PROTECTION AND NLW: A BASIC TENSION

It must be observed, however, that NLW do not come without problems. Equipping all US combat forces with NLW may create a tension between the operational commander's objective of minimizing non-combatant casualties and the US forces' inherent right and obligation of self-defense. Placing NLW in the hands of US forces indicates a "commitment to use minimal force."²⁶ However, it is DoD policy that the "availability of non-lethal weapons shall not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense."²⁷ Soldiers should most certainly not kill innocent bystanders... but they should also not allow themselves or their buddies [to be] lynched by a mob..."²⁸ Thus, how do we establish the middle ground between these two competing interests? The middle-ground, where US forces minimize non-combatant casualties while ensuring proper use of self-defense, resides in the quality of training given to US forces. Comprehensive and relevant, scenario-driven training will ensure US forces are able to craft the appropriate balance between these two interests.

In training forces on NLW, commanders must always ensure their combat forces do not misinterpret their training and become less willing to use lethal force.²⁹ The training should point towards a balance; of using the right amount of force for the specific situation. The key is, and will continue to be, well-trained commanders leading well-trained and equipped combat forces in order that the right force decisions are made under the most stressful of situations. The flexibility of NLW "reduces the possibility of innocent casualties, and, most importantly, protects [combat forces] by allowing them to better control the situation."³⁰

A FUTURE WARS REQUIREMENT: TRAINING AND EQUIPPING ON NLW

In future wars, the operational commander will need his combat forces to be able to swiftly adapt from using deadly force against enemy combatants to using NLW in peacekeeping-like rule of law situations.³¹ As real-time press coverage reaches into every corner of the world, the operational commander will also need to keep in mind the perceptions created by US combat forces' use of deadly force against non-combatants. Still photos alone can forcefully argue a point. However, moving pictures can do it even more powerfully. A video of civilians being cut down by US forces' service rifles will drown out any US contentions that its forces were legally using deadly force against civilians wielding rocks and sticks. This concept was made even clearer in January 2004, when British troops and Iraqi police, not possessing any NLW capability, shot and killed riotous Iraqi civilians during a protest in the town of Amorah. Despite British protestations, the regional media portrayed the actions as indiscriminate killing. Regardless of the legality of such actions, the political costs can be incalculable. This example once again highlights the need for US combat forces to organically possess NLW.³²

Future wars will also continue to be fast paced. With this pace will come the requirement for fast and accurate decisions. These decisions must, on occasion, be made at the lowest levels, when no time exists to call higher headquarters for a decision. A critical criterion to determine if a serviceman is prepared to effectively transition between non-lethal and lethal means is the speed and efficiency of execution. The service member's ability to transition must be quick enough to ensure self-defense, but smooth enough to ensure correct decisions are made.³³ However, training on the transition between lethal and NLW cannot be

limited to the physical movements involved. That training, while important, will not adequately teach the individual service member how to execute the necessary machinations under stressful and time-compressed situations. Instead, the operational commander must ensure his combat forces are trained through scenarios, and under such conditions as to, as much as possible, reproduce the stress and time factors they will likely face. This type of training will go a long way to “build individual confidence and ensure effective employment.”³⁴ Such training will not preclude all mistakes. However, it should make the right decision the norm and not the exception.

SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING AND THE CORRECT USE-OF-FORCE RESPONSE

US forces must be properly trained on NLW. The forces must be educated on not only the physical aspects of their use, but on the “when” and “why” as well. Training on NLW “must reach the same level of proficiency as arming for war.”³⁵ The instruction on NLW must become a regular and vital part of the training routine at each level of command. Similar to training on ROE, scenario-based training “is essential to help the individual [service member] make the right decision under stress.”³⁶ Training such as this will also imprint important use-of-force concepts in the mind of the service member. However, it is the relevance of such training that is key to its ultimate success. The relevance of the training lies in its relationship to real-world situations the force may face, as well as the way the concepts are pushed across to the service members. Properly developed scenarios will prepare the service member to “rapidly assess a situation and control it.”³⁷ While scenario-based training intuitively makes sense, it must be constantly reviewed and updated. It is

incumbent upon commanders at the tactical and operational levels to “lean forward” in the development of realistic scenarios within which use-of-force training will take place. For example, if a commander, through his read of world events, current intelligence briefs, etc., believes it possible that his combat force will face, along with enemy combat forces, a group of angry civilians protesting within a city, he can ensure development of scenarios to help his forces prepare for that eventuality. Even if that engagement never materializes, the service member will have gained invaluable training. These scenarios not only teach the service member how to react to a specific situation, they also teach him to think; to relate classroom concepts to real world events. The more varied scenarios trained to, the better the service member will understand the overarching concept of the use-of-force continuum.

Prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, senior U.S. Marine Corps commanders had their subordinate commanders trained on the mission the senior commanders expected to receive. The commanders were trained on self-defense and ROE. The training was filled with different scenarios the Marines expected to encounter. The commanders, in turn, were directed to take this training to their Marines and prepare them for the upcoming invasion. The use of “what if” scenarios by the trainers helped the commanders understand, in real-world terms, how these use-of-force concepts would relate to them and their Marines. For example, one scenario trained to involved the following; “What if a small child carrying a shoebox approaches your vehicle one day after two Marines were killed when a similar box containing a grenade exploded?”³⁸ To be effective, the training must be comprehensive, relevant, and scenario-based. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), LtGen William Wallace, US Army, led V Corps into Baghdad. Afterwards, he stated that it was a tribute to his soldiers that they, under stressful conditions, did such a

good job of understanding when to “pull a trigger,” and when to “pass out a band-aid.”³⁹

Thus, we see that proper training on the mission and the commander’s intent, with regard to minimization of non-combatant casualties, can have tremendous battlefield results. Scenario-based training will ultimately result in combat forces ready and able to make the right decisions in severely time-compressed and stressful situations.

SEPARATE FORCES FOR LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MEANS?

An important question in the context of this discussion is whether the training and equipping of US combat forces on non-lethal means will reduce their overall combat effectiveness. There are many in the defense community who believe that the creation of a NLW capability in US combat forces will come at the expense of war fighting capabilities.⁴⁰ This issue, among others, was studied during a Joint War Game held at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA from 1-5 May 2005. Early returns from the war game indicated that using US combat forces to simultaneously conduct both phase III and IV operations would place a “strain” on those forces, possibly diminishing their capacity to conduct major combat operations.⁴¹ One specific idea to address this perceived problem is to have a separate, “non-lethal” subordinate unit within each larger unit. This subordinate unit would maneuver with its parent unit and be on-call for all NLW needs.⁴² While initially sounding plausible, when exposed to the heat of reality’s bright lights, the idea of two separate forces is exposed for what it is; a throwback to a time when the battlefield allowed for the transition time required for this to work. Future wars will not, as the Kosovo operation afforded members of TF Falcon, allow time for combat forces to call a ‘time-out’ so that subordinate units with NLW expertise can be brought in to handle the crisis. Much

more likely is the scenario encountered recently by US Marines in Ramadi where they had only split seconds to make a decision with regard to the use-of-force as non-combatants, or those dressed as non-combatants, approached their vehicles. Keeping NLW with only a part of the force ignores the time-compressed, stressful realities that US combat forces will face in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ROE can be used to limit a subordinate commander's ability to employ certain weapon systems during an operation. However, once his combat forces are trained and equipped on NLW, the operational commander must continually strive to ensure that the ROE do not unduly restrict his subordinate commanders' ability to use them. In order to ensure there are as few non-combatant casualties as possible, when given the expected time-compressed situations future tactical commanders will face, the operational commander must trust his subordinate commanders' judgment on when and how to use their NLW. In fact, the point of having combat forces trained and equipped on NLW is obviated if the operational commander withholds authority for their employment. If such restraints are imposed in the future, the operational and tactical commanders will inevitably be faced with situations wherein they do not even have the time to ask for permission to use NLW, let alone wait for an answer. They will then have no choice but to employ lethal weapons to protect their forces. Instead, once such a scenario presents itself, the on-scene commander needs the authority to employ whichever weapon system he believes is necessary to accomplish the mission and protect his forces with the least amount of non-combatant casualties.

NLW deliver to US combat forces the ability to transition along the entire “use-of-force continuum. The training required on both lethal and non-lethal means must result in a force capable of using not just threats, on one end of the use-of-force continuum, and deadly force, on the other; but everything in between.

CONCLUSION

The growing overlap between phase III and IV operations requires the operational commander to ensure his combat forces are trained and equipped in both lethal and non-lethal means. Future conflicts containing situations that will expose a combat force’s inability to transition along the use-of-force continuum are out there, about to occur. Only well-trained combat forces, capable of quickly and smoothly traversing the use-of-force continuum, will be prepared to prosecute each situation such that they move closer to accomplishing their mission, while ensuring there are as few non-combatant casualties as possible. There are many aspects to Phase IV operations about which the operational commander needs to be concerned. For example, he will need to understand the culture of the area as well as the unique characteristics of the populace and their economy so that he may more effectively set the stage for a viable post-conflict peace. However, ensuring that the local populace is not further alienated by non-combatant casualties caused by US combat forces will be one of his most important phase IV objectives. In the end, NLW give the operational commander’s combat forces the ability to make a positive difference; that of using the right amount of force for the specific situation.

NOTES

¹ Anthony C. Zinni, General, USMC (Ret.), “Understanding What Victory Is,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, (October 2003): 32.

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-19.

³ US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program FY00 Master Plan (Washington, DC: June 2000), 2.

⁴ Although many different non-lethal weapons systems exist in the US inventory, the key is finding *one* weapon system that adequately addresses both lethal and non-lethal methods. The wait for a system like this may be at an end. The “DREAD,” a man-portable weapon system promises devastating lethality along with the ability to easily transition to a non-lethal capability. This ability to transition lies in the system’s easy-to-change projectile velocity. The inventor, weapons designer Charles St. George, states that the system is not only a possibility, but that it “has already happened....and will arrive soon.”

Crane, David. DREAD Weapon System: Devastating, Jam-Proof, and Silent. 28 June 2004.

<<http://www.defense-review.com/modules.php?name=news&file=article&sid=526>> [16 May 2005], 1-3.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Directive number 3000.3: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (Washington, DC: 1996), 2.

⁶ U.S. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program FY00 Master Plan, 1.

⁷ Ann Roosevelt, “Military Wants More, Better Non-Lethal Weapons,” Defense Daily, 7 November 2003, p.1

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 4.

⁹ John B. Alexander, Colonel US Army (Retired), Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First-Century Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1999), 197.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, DC: 30 November 2004), 463.

¹¹ Michael J. Popovich, Major, US Marine Corps, “The Tactical Employment of Non-Lethal Technologies,” (Unpublished Research Paper, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1997), 18.

¹² Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First-Century Warfare, 14.

¹³ Popovich, 11.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, III-18.

¹⁵ Ibid., III-18.

¹⁶ Ibid., III-21.

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Pub 5-0 (Washington, DC: 25 January 2002), II-17.

¹⁸ “President Bush’s Remarks on the End of Major Combat,” The New York Times, 2 May 2003, p. A-16.

¹⁹ John B. Alexander, "Non-Lethal Weapons to Gain Relevancy in Future Conflicts," National Defense, (March 2002): 30.

²⁰ Jefferson Morris, "Task Force Calls for Major Push in Non-Lethal Weapons," Aerospace Daily, 27 February 2004, p.1.

²¹ Roosevelt, 1.

²² New technology is expensive. Though not an earth-shattering concept, it exposes another critical aspect involved in the potential training and equipping of all US combat forces on non-lethal means. As stated, the cost to equip combat forces with both "light and relevant" NLW will not be cheap. These budget increases, along with the attendant expansion of use-of-force capabilities, would improve US forces' effectiveness in Phase III and Phase IV operations. A ten-fold annual increase in funding (from \$30 to \$300 million) would represent a tremendous commitment to match the requirements placed upon US combat forces in phase III and IV operations with the necessary capabilities to get the job done. The future battlefield promises to require non-lethal and lethal capabilities from US forces. A large increase in the NLW budget is necessary and long overdue.

²³ Lewer and Schofield, 52.

²⁴ "The Military in Transition: From Combat to Containment," The New York Times, 19 April 2003, p.B-8.

²⁵ "International: When Deadly Force Bumps into Hearts and Minds; Iraq," The Economist, (January 2005): 40.

²⁶ Nick Lewer and Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction? (London: Zed Books 1997), 128.

²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 3.

²⁸ Massimo Annati and Enzo Bonsignore, "Non-Lethal Weapons," Military Technology, (July 2003): 45.

²⁹ Paul R. Capstick, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, "Non-Lethal Weapons and Strategic Policy Implications for 21st Century Peace Operations," (Unpublished Research Paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2001), 15.

³⁰ Gary W. Anderson, "Marine Corps Planning Systems for Integrating Non-Lethal Weapons into Combined Arms MAGTF Operations," The Air, Land, Sea Bulletin, (August 1997): 4.

³¹ Annati and Bonsignore, 45.

³² Geoff S. Fein, "Non-Lethal Weapons Find their Niche in Urban Combat," National Defense, (March 2004): 14.

³³ Popovich, 33.

³⁴ Ibid., 42.

³⁵ Frederick M. Lorenz, Colonel US Marine Corps, "'Less-Lethal' Force in Operation UNITED SHIELD," Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1995): 73.

³⁶ Frederick M. Lorenz, Colonel US Marine Corps, "Rules of engagement training," Marine Corps Gazette, (Sep 1996): 77.

³⁷ W. Dyal, "Escalating the response," Marine Corps Gazette, (Apr 2003): 42.

³⁸ “Marines Bone Up on Laws of War” USA Today, (March 19, 2003), 6A.

³⁹ Cordesman, Anthony H. Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerilla War?” 25 July 2003.
<http://www.csis.org/press/pr03_45.htm> [26 April 2005], 9.

⁴⁰ Cordesman, 17.

⁴¹ DiMascio, Jen. Game Reveals Insights About Running Combat, Stability Ops at Same Time. 10 May 2005.
< <http://insidedefense.com/secure/insider.asp?issue=05102005>> {11 May 2005}, 1.

⁴² Capstick, 16.

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